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JUVENILE EXECUTION, TERRORIST EXTRADITION,
AND SUPREME COURT DISCRETION TO CONSIDER
INTERNATIONAL DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE
Elizabeth Burleson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Multilateral treaties and international institutions have impacted
the extradition of capital offenders and influenced the development
of human rights law within the United States. Refusal to extradite
without assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed has
continuing ramifications for the implementation of transnational
counter-terrorism measures. In the absence of consensus regarding
the death penalty, prohibition against torture has served as
justification for not extraditing people who would be likely to face
death sentences. Determining a contemporary standard of decency
regarding cruel and unusual punishment, what shocks the public
conscience, or what constitutes torture depends upon what societal
parameters one uses. Should capital punishment remain within the
purview of provincial criminal law, depend upon national
sentiment, or consider international legal standards?
The execution of foreign nationals without notification of their
consular rights has internationalized the United States' death
penalty policy. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has
been willing to consider international developments in relation to
evolving standards of decency. The Court has extended greater
protection on the basis of sexual orientation and prohibited the
execution of individuals with mental retardation. In Roper v.
Simmons, the United States Supreme Court determined that it is
cruel and unusual to execute sixteen and seventeen year olds.1
Prior to 2005, the United States had executed seventy percent of the
* L.L.M., London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., University of Connecticut
School of Law. Ms Burleson has also written reports for UNICEF and UNESCO.
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005). The phrases "juvenile death penalty,"
"juvenile capital punishment," and "juvenile executions" refer to the execution of individuals
who were younger than eighteen at the time that they committed their crimes.
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juveniles that have been put to death worldwide since 1998.2 Up
until the Roper decision, there were eighty-two people between the
ages of sixteen and eighteen on death row in the United States.
While customary international law prohibiting capital
punishment has yet to fully develop, collective condemnation of
torture exists and has had a significant impact on extradition law.
In Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights held that the United States would expose Soering to a real
risk of torture in violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights ("ECHR").4 The European Court of Human Rights based its
decision on the length of time that Soering was likely to spend on
death row in Virginia; the mounting anxiety of awaiting execution;
and on Soering's youth and mental state at the time of the offense.'
While subsequent decisions around the world have not always
followed Soering, a growing body of case law provides a warning to
States that still use the death penalty that their extradition treaties
may not be upheld without assurances that capital punishment will
not be imposed.
This article considers the obligations of a supreme court in a
liberal democracy and the effect that public opinion has upon the
legality of the death penalty. Given the mounting need for
international coordination to maintain peace and security, a
consensus must be reached regarding capital punishment.
II. THE EFFECT OF MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL TREATIES ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
As criminal conduct increasingly becomes transboundary, the
European Court of Human Rights continues to clarify the scope of
the ECHR. A per se rule is developing against extradition of a
suspect who potentially will face capital punishment.6 Ocalan v.
2 See Amnesty International, Indecent and Internationally Illegal: The Death Penalty
Against Child Offenders (2002), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/document.do
?id=4F86BOB7CA5B235A80256C3200478E26 (last visited May 30, 2005).
3 See American Civil Liberties Union, Juveniles and the Death Penalty (May 11, 2004),
available at http://www.aclu.org/DeathPenalty/DeathPenalty.cfm?ID=14837&c=66 (last
visited May 30, 2005).
' Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). The European Court of
Human Rights, located in Strasbourg, France, was established in 1959 to determine
violations of the 1950 Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (known as the European Convention on Human Rights). A permanent full-time
court came into operation on November 1, 1998, superseding a two-tier, part-time court and
commission.
Id.
6 While Article 2 of the ECHR protects an individual's right to life, the Convention did not
[Vol. 68
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Turkey may shed light on whether member States can extradite
terrorist suspects to nonmember States if there is a risk that they
will receive the death penalty.
A. Extradition and the War on Terrorism
The war on terrorism has concentrated efforts to bring to justice
suspects who flee across international borders. Extradition
proceedings allow the international community to consider the
lawful parameters of such a war vis a vis human rights. Soering v.
United Kingdom provides a guide for countries who extradite
suspects to retentionist States.8 Ocalan v. Turkey further clarifies
the balance that should be struck between fundamental human
rights and counter-terrorism measures in regard to the extradition
of terrorist suspects.9
In 1998, Syria expelled a Turkish national, Abdullah Ocalan.
Prior to this expulsion, Syria had protected Ocalan for years from
Turkish prosecution for his leadership of the Kurdistan Workers'
prohibit capital punishment. Rather, Article 2(1) was interpreted to allow States to execute
people, provided that the sentence was proportional to the crime committed. The Sixth
Protocol to the ECHR, however, abolished the death penalty for States that chose to become
signatories. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, 1983
Europe T.S. No. 114.
Protocol 6 was signed in 1983 and came into force in 1985. In 1994, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to make ratification of the Sixth Protocol a
prerequisite for membership in the Council of Europe. See Recommendation 1246 on the
Abolition of Capital Punishment, Eur. Parl. Ass., 25th Sess. (1994); Resolution 1044 on the
Abolition of Capital Punishment, Eur. Parl. Ass., 25th Sess. (1994) at para. 6; Roger Hood,
The Death Penalty: The USA in World Perspective, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 517, 521
(1997). The following forty-six states comprise the Council of Europe: Albania, Andorra,
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian
Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," Turkey, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom. See The Council of Europe's Member States, available at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/ Member-states/default.asp (last visited May 31,
2005).
All new members to the ECHR had to agree to abolish the death penalty, except for acts
committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war. The Sixth Protocol has since been
superseded by the Thirteenth Protocol to the ECHR, which abolishes the death penalty in all
circumstances. See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances,
May 3, 2002, entered into force, July 1, 2003, 2002 Europe T.S. No. 187.
' See Jon Yorke, Europe's Judicial Inquiry in Extradition Cases: Closing the Door on The
Death Penalty, EUR. L. REV. 2004, 29(4), 546-56.
8 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 479-82 paras. 113-15, 120-24.
' See Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 (App. No. 46221/99) para. 90 (2003).
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Party ("PKK"). Ocalan traveled from Greece to Russia to Italy. The
latter refused Turkey's extradition request since Ocalan faced a real
risk of being sentenced to death. The Turkish Government
eventually caught him in Kenya on February 15, 1999. His
abduction, blindfolding, and lack of access to legal assistance led the
European Court of Human Rights to rule that the death sentence
imposed by the Ankara State Security Court and upheld by the
Court of Cassation violated the ECHR.'0
It remains to be seen whether the European Court of Human
Rights will reinforce the Article 3 human rights test set forth in
Soering in light of the war on terrorism. Thus far, Europe has
remained resolute concerning non-extradition in death penalty
cases. The United Kingdom ratified Protocol 13 on October 10,
2003. On December 16, 2003, President George W. Bush called for
Saddam Hussein to receive a death sentence." Bruce Zagaris notes
that, "Mr. Hussein will be tried by an occupied country with no
legitimate government and by a criminal justice system with little
experience in the complex legal issues posed by this trial."'2 He goes
on to note that although the Coalition Provisional Authority
suspended capital punishment in Iraq, the death penalty remains
on the books and could be brought back in a case against Saddam
Hussein. On June 29, 2004, the European Court of Human Rights
declined to grant Saddam Hussein's interim measure request:
to permanently prohibit the United Kingdom from
facilitating, allowing for, acquiescing in, or in any other form
whatsoever effectively participating, through an act or
omission, in the transfer of the applicant to the custody of
the Iraqi Interim Government unless and until the Iraqi
interim Government has provided adequate assurances that
10 Id. at paras. 211-15. Subsequently, Turkey abolished the death penalty in peacetime
pursuant to Law no. 4771, which was published on August 9, 2002. Press Release, European
Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Hearing: Ocalan v. Turkey (June 9, 2004), available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/June/HearingOcalanvTurkeyO90604.htm (last
visited May 30, 2005). The Ankara State Security Court commuted Ocalan's death sentence
to life imprisonment on October 3, 2002. Id. The Constitutional Court rejected an effort to
make a terrorist exception to the ban on capital punishment on December 27, 2002. Id. The
European Court of Human Rights Chamber judgment of March 12, 2003 found that Turkeyhad violated Article 3 of the ECHR by imposing a death sentence after an unfair trial. Id.
Pursuant to Article 43 of the ECHR, a party may request that the case be referred to the
Grand Chamber of the Court if the case raises a serious legal issue. Id. Such a request was
accepted and a decision is pending. Id.
" Edward Alden et al., Bush Calls for Death Sentence for Saddam, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2003, at 15.
2 Bruce Zagaris, Iraq Governing Council Establish Special Tribunal and Saddam Hussein
is Arrested, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. (Feb. 2004).
[Vol. 68
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the applicant will not be subject to the death penalty. 13
Saddam Hussein may still pursue a case before the European
Court of Human Rights that the United Kingdom violated Article 3
of the ECHR by not requiring assurances that he will not face a
death sentence4 Such a case might clarify ECHR member
obligations outside of Europe.
In light of increased global terrorism, the United States and the
European Union have agreed to speed up extradition of suspected
terrorists. Yet fast track extradition retains the following anti-
death penalty article:
Where the offence for which extradition is sought is
punishable by death under the laws in the requesting State
and not punishable by death under the laws in the requested
State, the requested State may grant extradition on the
condition that the death penalty shall not be imposed on the
person sought, or if for procedural reasons such condition
cannot be complied with by the requesting State, on
condition that the death penalty if imposed shall not be
carried out. If the requesting State accepts extradition
subject to conditions pursuant to this Article, it shall comply
with the conditions. If the requesting State does not accept
the conditions, the request for extradition may be denied.
5
The execution of foreign nationals and extradition of suspects
arrested in other countries who are wanted for crimes in the United
States raises the use of capital punishment in the United States to
an international level. Extraditing people who may face death
sentences is unacceptable to an increasing number of countries.
Counter terrorism measures and the war on terrorism have
strained already tenuous diplomatic relationships, particularly
when suspects may be tried in military tribunals that do not have
due process procedures comparable to those of civilian 
courts.' 6
Canada and Mexico have joined European countries in refusing to
extradite if a suspect faces a death sentence within the United
"' Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights
Rejects Interim Measures by Saddam Hussein (Jun. 29, 2004), available at
http:/www.ECHR.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/June/RequestforInterimmeasure-SaddamHussein.
htm (last visited May 30, 2005).
14 Id.
'5 Agreement on Extradition, June 25, 2003, U.S.-E.U., 2003 O.J. (L 181) 27, at art. 13.
16 The 2001 execution of Timothy McVeigh for bombing the Oklahoma City Federal
Building marked the first federal execution since 1963. The alleged twentieth terrorist of the
September 11th attacks, Zacarias Moussaoui, may also be executed. The United States
assured the United Kingdom that capital punishment would not be sought against British
citizens held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, pending military tribunals.
20051
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States.17 Having lost its seat on the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights in 2001, and only recently being allowed re-
admittance, the United States does not want the further notoriety of
losing observer status in the Council of Europe. Yet, United States
death penalty policy jeopardizes relations with the European Union,
which has made progress toward abolition as a requirement of
admission. 18
B. Foreign Nationals: Mexico v. United States and
Notification of Consular Rights
International law may not develop as a result of prosecuting
former heads of state such as Saddam Hussein or Pinochet, but
international norms are impacting the United States' death penalty
policy in other ways. International views are beginning to influence
due process provisions for foreign nationals facing death sentences.
1. Mexico v. United States and Notification of Consular Rights
The United States has been criticized severely by the
international community for violating the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention"). 19  Years of
noncompliance came to a head when Paraguay attempted tointervene on behalf of its national, Breard, who had a scheduled
execution in Virginia in 1998.20 Paraguay brought a case to theInternational Court of Justice ("ICJ"), receiving an order for a stay
of execution.2
The United States did not honor the order and Breard was
executed. Similarly, in 2001, the ICJ ruled in LaGrand Case that
the United States had violated international law by refusing to
notify two German defendants of their rights to consular advice
under the Vienna Convention, and in refusing to stay the order of
execution until the ICJ had reached a decision.22 The two Germans
had not been informed of their consular rights, prompting Germany
17 Richard C. Dieter, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the U.S., FOREIGNSERVICE J. (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=17&
did=806 (last visited May 30, 2005).
18 Id.
" See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1969, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596U.N.T.S. 261 (requiring a State to notify all detained foreign nationals without delay of their
consular rights). The United States ratified the Convention in 1969.20 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372, 374 (1998).
21 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
22 See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 515-16 (June 27).
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to bring a case before the ICJ, which unanimously agreed upon a
stay of execution.23 When the United States rejected the order and
proceeded to execute the brothers, Germany continued to pursue the
ICJ case.
In its 2003 decision in Mexico v. United States, the ICJ held that
the United States has systematically violated the Vienna
Convention by failing to inform defendants of their consular rights
in fifty-one out of fifty-two cases.24 The ICJ ruled that the United
States is required to provide effective judicial review.25 It also
mandated that the United States reconsider the ramifications of
Vienna Convention violations for the use of capital punishment
against foreign nationals. Ultimately, Condoleezza Rice, the United
States Secretary of State, "informed U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan that the United States 'hereby withdraws' from the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 26
2. Roper v. Simmons and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
In support of a European Union amicus curiae brief submitted to
the United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, Mexico
attached the following statement:
Of the seventy-three juvenile offenders currently
incarcerated on death rows across the United States, three
are Mexican nationals. Both Tonatihu Aguilar Saucedo, who
was sixteen at the time of the offense for which he received
the death penalty, and Martin Rail Fong Soto, who was
seventeen, were sentenced to death in Arizona. Osvaldo
Regalado Soriano was sentenced to death in Texas for a
crime committed when he was seventeen years old.27
The Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") forbids
juvenile executions under the age of eighteen.2' The CRC has been
23 id.
24 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No.
128, at para. 106 (Mar. 31).
25 Id. para. 121.
26 Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases; Foes of Death Penalty Cite Access
to Envoys, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at Al.
27 Brief of Amici Curiae The European Union and Members of the International
Community, at 2a, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at
www.internationaljusticeproject.org/juvSimmonsEUamicus.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
28 Article 37 of the CRC states that: "Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment
without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below
eighteen years of age." Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA/RES/44/25, annex, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), available at http://www.unhchr.ch
/htmllmenu3fb/k2crc.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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ratified by 192 States.29 While Somalia and the United States are
the only countries that have not yet ratified the CRC, both states
have signed it.3° Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties requires States not to defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty once a country has signed the treaty.3 The United
States is the only country to publicly express its belief in the right
to sentence juveniles to death. The CRC and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") are the only global
instruments explicitly prohibiting the use of the death penalty
against individuals under the age of eighteen. The Human Rights
Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child review
country reports that measure treaty compliance. Every country
other than the United States is a party to either the CRC or the
ICCPR without reserving the right to execute juvenile offenders.
The ICCPR was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and
came into force in 1976.32 Article 6(1) provides that "[e]very human
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."33 While capital
punishment can still be used for serious crimes subsequent to due
process, Article 6(6) sends a strong message that abolition of the
death penalty is the ultimate objective of international human
rights law. It states that "[niothing in this article shall be invoked
to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any
-State Party to the present Covenant. 34  In December 1989, the
United Nations General Assembly went further by adopting the
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Article 1 of which states: "No one within the
29 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (Oct. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pcf.
30 Id.
" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Opened for Signature May 23, 1969, art. 18,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336. Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
reads:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of
the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.Id.
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
13 Id. art. 6(1).
34 Id. art. 6(6).
[Vol. 68
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jurisdiction of a State party to the present Protocol shall be
executed."35
While the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992, it made a
reservation to Article 6, allowing for the continued use of capital
punishment in keeping with the U.S. Constitution. The reservation
stated that:
The United States reserves the right, subject to its
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on
any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of
capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.36
The last line of this reservation expressly rejects the ICCPR
Article 6(5) prohibition of executing juveniles.37 No other country
has made a substantive reservation to Article 6. In fact, eleven
member States of the ICCPR have objected to the United States'
reservation, insisting that it is illegal as contrary to the goal of the
convention.38  In 1995, the Human Rights Committee agreed,
concluding that the United States' reservation is invalid since it
conflicts with the purpose of the convention. In contrast to the
original ICCPR document, Article 2 of the Second Optional Protocol
limits States' ability to make reservations to the complete
prohibition of capital punishment.39
In making reservations to the ICCPR, the United States has
rejected the Soering notion that a "death row phenomenon"
constitutes "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment., 40 Instead, the United States prohibits cruel, unusual
" Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 44th
Sess., 82d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/128 (1990) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol].
36 United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 653 (1992).
37 In contrast to the international standard of eighteen, the United States had allowed
individuals over the age of sixteen to be put to death. As Justice Scalia stated in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989):
We discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the
imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.
Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not offend the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 380.
"' See Reservations, Declarations, Notifications and Objections Relating to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols Thereto, U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/2[Rev.4 (1994).
9 See Second Optional Protocol, supra note 35.
0 John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human
Rights, 92 AM. J. INTL L. 187, 198 (1998).
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and inhumane treatment or punishment only insofar as it is
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court assessed, but rejected,
international condemnation of executing juveniles under eighteen in
Thompson v. Oklahoma.4' Stanford v. Kentucky found that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty for crimes
committed by sixteen or seventeen year old offenders.42
For the first time since the late 1980s, the Court agreed to
consider whether executing individuals who were under the age of
eighteen when the crime was committed constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment-Roper v. Simmons was argued on October 13,
2004.43 Christopher Simmons was seventeen when he committed
the murder-robbery for which he received a death sentence. In light
of the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency" rationale in
Atkins v. Virginia that banned the execution of people who are
mentally retarded, 44 Simmons brought a claim that a similar
evolution had developed for juvenile death sentences. In 2003, the
Supreme Court of Missouri overturned Simmons conviction, ruling
that "a national consensus has developed against the execution ofjuvenile offenders., 45  By a vote of five-to-four, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the ruling made by the Missouri Supreme Court.
Thus, the United States has joined the rest of the world in
abolishing the death penalty for crimes committed prior to the age
of eighteen. On March 1, 2005, Roper v. Simmons held that the
execution of individuals who were between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen at the time that the crime was committed violates the
4' 487 U.S. 815 (1998) (holding that the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibited executing juveniles who were fifteen or younger at the time of the
offense).
42 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
43 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
" Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).
45 The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that:[aipplying the approach taken in Atkins, this Court finds that, in the fourteen years
since Stanford was decided, a national consensus has developed against the execution ofjuvenile offenders, as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states now bar such
executions for juveniles, that twelve other states bar executions altogether, that no statehas lowered its age of execution below 18 since Stanford, that five states have
legislatively or by case law raised or established the minimum age at 18, and that the
imposition of the juvenile death penalty has become truly unusual over the last decade.
Accordingly, this Court finds the Supreme Court would today hold such executions are
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It therefore sets aside Mr.Simmons' death sentence and re-sentences him to life imprisonment without eligibility
for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor.
State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Mo. 2003).
918 [Vol. 68
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Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.46
Since the 1976 reintroduction of capital punishment, twenty-two
individuals in seven states have been put to death for offenses that
they committed when they were less than eighteen years old. 7
Roper v. Simmons had the effect of moving seventy-two individuals
who were under eighteen at the time of their offenses off of death
row.
48
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy based the finding that
"the death penalty constitutes an excessive sanction for the entire
category" of offenders whose crimes were committed under the age
of 18 on (1) national consensus,49 (2) the independent judgment of
the Supreme Court Justices,5 and (3) international law and
practice."
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that "were my office that
of a legislator, rather than a judge, then I, too, would be inclined to
support legislation setting a minimum age of 18 in this context.'52
The majority opinion speaks to this concern in noting that the
United States Congress rejected juvenile execution in enacting the
Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994.53 Congress concluded that
juveniles should not receive the death penalty. 4  In a dissent
delivered from the bench, Justice Scalia contended that the 1992
United States reservation to the ICCPR indicates a lack of national
consensus for the abolition of juvenile capital punishment.5 The
majority did not agree in light of the Federal Death Penalty Act of
46 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
4' Death Penalty Information Center, Supreme Court Bans Execution of Juvenile
Offenders, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1329&scid=64 (last
visited May 30, 2005).
41 See Nina Totenberg, National Public Radio, Supreme Court Ends Death Penalty for
Juveniles, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4518051 (last
visited May 30, 2005) (twenty-nine in Texas; fourteen in Alabama; five in Mississippi; four in
Arizona; four in Louisiana; four in North Carolina; three in Florida; three in South Carolina;
two in Georgia; two in Pennsylvania; one in Nevada; and one in Virginia).
49 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
o Id. at 1200.
5' Id. Joining Justice Kennedy were Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Id. at 1187.
52 Id. at 1217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 1194.
' 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (1994). The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 was enacted as Title VI
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and became effective on
September 13, 1994.
55 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in
Stanford v. Kentucky which was overturned by Roper v. Simmons. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's Roper dissent. While Justice Kennedy had joined
Scalia in holding that the juvenile death penalty remained constitutional in 1989, by 2005 he
believed that standards of decency had evolved.
9192005]
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1994 and of the fact that the majority of states no longer permit
juvenile capital punishment.16 The trend has been consistently in
the direction of abolition and it is an unusual punishment in those
states where the death penalty remains on the books. 7
Since the 1992 ICCPR reservation to the Article 6(5) prohibition
of juvenile capital punishment, five more states across the nation
had prohibited death sentences for juveniles. This brought the
number of states that did not permit juvenile death sentences to
thirty. 8 Federal and military death sentences also require that an
individual be at least eighteen at the time of the offense. Out of the
thirty-eight states that retain capital punishment, nineteen states
do not prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia insisted that if the analysis were
restricted to death-penalty states alone, then the eighteen states
that allow capital punishment for adults but not juveniles do not
represent a majority of the death penalty states.5 9 In contrast, the
majority in Roper v. Simmons included the twelve states that have
abolished the death penalty outright.6 ° When these states are
considered, there is a clear national consensus against juvenile
capital punishment.
In making its own independent judgment, the majority's analysis
considered recent scientific research indicating that juveniles'
capacity for reasoning and restricting impulsivity is much less
developed than that of adults. Combined with an increased
vulnerability to outside pressure and a still developing character,
the majority concluded that, "[t]hese differences render suspect any
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders., 6' As a
result, "it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime
committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved
character. 6 2 A government may take away "basic liberties," but it
may not execute anyone whose crime was committed as a juvenile.63
Roper v. Simmons reaffirmed the relevance of international law
and practice in United States constitutional jurisprudence. "It is
proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty," Justice
56 Id. at 1194.
57 id.
58 Id. at 1192.
59 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 1192.
61 Id. at 1195.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1197.
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Kennedy noted. 64 "The opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions., 65  Justice O'Connor joined
the majority on this point, noting in her dissenting opinion that:
[o]ver the course of nearly half a century, the Court has
consistently referred to foreign and international law as
relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of
decency... [T]his Nation's evolving understanding of human
dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor
inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other
countries.66
Since the Eighth Amendment comes from a provision in the
English Declaration of Rights of 1689,67 United Kingdom
jurisprudence has significant relevance in determining what is cruel
and unusual. The United Kingdom, currently without a death
penalty, abolished juvenile execution long before addressing capital
punishment generally. Parliament ended juvenile executions by
enacting the Children and Young Person's Act of 193368 and the
Criminal Justice Act of 1948.69 The United States has a distinct
national character from that of the United Kingdom. Yet, as Justice
Kennedy has pointed out, "[iut does not lessen our fidelity to the
Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations
and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom."7 ° This statement builds upon
Atkins' 2002 reaffirmation that the Supreme Court may consider
international developments in determining "evolving standards of
decency."7"
64 Id. at 1200; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Committee of the Bar of
England and Wales, Human Rights Advocates, Human Rights Watch, and the World
Organization for Human Rights USA, 2005 WL 1628523, at *12, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183 [hereinafter Human Rights Brief].
65 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
6 Id. at 1215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6'7 According to the Human Rights Brief, the principle of cruel and unusual punishment
itself came from the Magna Carta. See Human Rights Brief, supra note 64, at *4. The
English Declaration of Rights of 1688 states that, "excessive bail ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted." 1 W. & M., c. 2, §10,
in 9 Eng. Stat. at Large 69 (1770).
68 Children and Young Person's Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 53, sched. 1 (Eng.) (rejecting
execution of those who were eighteen when they were sentenced).
69 Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, § 16 (Eng.) (abolishing capital
punishment for individuals under eighteen at the time their crime was committed).
70 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
71 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12. Atkins returned to Thompson's approach rather than
the approach taken in Stanford. See id. at 316 n.21. While the Court in Thompson said that
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3. Atkins v. Virginia, Mental Retardation, and Comparative
Constitutionalism
In its 1989 Penry v. Lynaugh decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the execution of individuals who are mentally retarded
did not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.72 Such a condition was only a mitigating factor since a
"national consensus" had not evolved against putting people who
were mentally retarded to death. Georgia and Maryland were the
only states to have banned executions of this kind. By 2002, the
Court was able to find that a national consensus had evolved
against executing people with mental retardation since sixteen
more states had prohibited such executions. Given this
development, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia found the execution of
people who are mentally retarded to be an unconstitutional
violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.73
The Supreme Court's reference in Atkins to the amicus curiae
brief filed by the European Union in favor of a ban indicates that
the United States' death penalty policy can be influenced by
international legal and political developments.74  Comparative
constitutionalism appears to be emerging as a means by which the
U.S. Supreme Court determines contemporary standards of decency
regarding cruel and unusual punishment and due process.75 Justice
Brennan's Stanford dissent,76 a plurality in Thompson,77 the
majority in Atkins,7 and the majority in Roper79 used a comparative
the laws and practices of other nations were relevant to determining current standards of
decency, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988), Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Stanford stated that the practices of foreign countries should not be
considered. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1.
72 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
"' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the execution of prisoners with mental retardation
was unconstitutional since a "national consensus" had developed that such executions were
cruel and unusual punishment). No states had reinstated juvenile capital punishment and
many states had passed legislation prohibiting executions of offenders with mentally
retardation. See id. at 315-16.
4 See Dieter, supra note 17.
7 A plurality of the Court in Trop v. Dulles noted that the scope of the Eighth Amendment
is not fixed; rather "evolving standards of decency" should be used in determining cruel and
unusual punishment. 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); see Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional
Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570, 2594-95 (2004).
76 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia
made the counter-argument that international law should not be relevant to constitutional
interpretation. See id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. The dissent argued that national developments,
particularly state legislation, should provide the basis for decency. Id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist,
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analysis of international developments to determine evolving
standards of decency. Beyond the death penalty context, Lawrence
v. Texas found a due process violation in part by considering ECHR
jurisprudence.80
C. Lawrence v. Texas and Consideration of International
Developments
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy explained that:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to
have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.1
Lawrence overturned Bowers v. Hardwick.2 In 2003, Lawrence
marked a turning point in the Supreme Court's readiness to
consider laws beyond the United States. 83 The Court looked to the
ECHR and ICCPR in determining the evolving standards of decency
regarding sexual orientation. In three separate decisions, the
European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the ECHR as
prohibiting criminalization of private, same-sex sexual conduct
between consenting adults.8 " In the 1981 Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom decision, the European Court of Human Rights found that
Northern Ireland's sodomy law could not be justified under Article
8(2) as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of morals
or the rights and freedoms of others.8 5 In reaching this conclusion,
the European Court of Human Rights observed that the majority of
the member states of the Council of Europe did not have similar
laws.8 6  It went on to note that Northern Ireland itself had not
C.J., dissenting).
79 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-1200.
8o See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
s, Id. at 578-79.
82 Id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). Bowers had upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia sex statute that prohibited private consensual adult sodomy
between two men. Id. at 196.
83 Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the Flag and Let it Talk" On the Use of External Norms in
Constitutional Decision Making, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 597, 598 (2004).
84 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 60 (1981); Norris v. Ireland,
142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 38 (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
paras. 23-26 (1993).
85 Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 60.
86 Id.
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enforced its law.87 In similar cases brought by David Norris against
the Republic of Ireland and by Alecos Modinos against Cyprus, the
European Court of Human Rights reached the same conclusion. In
Norris v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights went on to
reject the notion that a government such as Ireland could claim that
"the moral fibre of a democratic nation is a matter for its own
institutions.... 88  In Modinos v. Cyprus, the European Court of
Human Rights held that the fact that a law such as that of Cyprus
had not been enforced was irrelevant to the country's obligation to
repeal the law.8 9
Toonen v. Australia broadens the Dudgeon rationale beyond
Europe.90  In 1994, the Human Rights Committee found that
Tasmania's criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct violated
Australia's obligations under the ICCPR.9  In particular, it
concluded that sections 122 and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal
Code92 violate ICCPR Article 17 right of privacy and Articles 2 and
26 right to nondiscrimination. 93 Furthermore, in a unanimous
decision, the Human Rights Committee concluded that the ICCPR
classification of "sex"e should be taken to include "sexual
orientation."94  Thus, sexual orientation discrimination can be
incorporated into the well-developed jurisprudence of sex
discrimination.
Toonen and Dudgeon exemplify international cases that have
influenced Supreme Court constitutional analysis. Recognizing that
society is fluid rather than a fixed entity enables a community to
move beyond exclusion to regain the original protective rationale for
having a society. Harold Hongju Koh suggests that American
exceptionalism can be laudable in the form of exceptional
87 id.
88 Norris, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 44-45.
89 Modinos, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 23-24.
9o Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPRC/50/D/48811992 (1994), available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/d22a00bcd1320c9c80256724005e60d5?Opendocument (last visited
Apr. 17, 2005).
" Id. para. 9.
92 Criminal Code Act, No. 69 (1924) (Tas.). Section 122(a) forbids "sexual intercourse with
any person against the order of nature," and section 122(c) forbids "consent[ing] to a male
person having sexual intercourse with him or her against the order of nature." Section 123
prohibits "indecent assault" and "act[s] of gross indecency" between males, "whether in public
or private."
" Toonen, UN Doc CCPPJC/50D/488/1992 paras. 8.2, 8.3. Article 2(1) relates to rights
recognized in the ICCPR itself, while Article 26 goes further in establishing a right to
equality, independent of the lCCPR. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 2, 17, 26.
9 Toonen, U.N. Doc. CCPRJC/50/D/488/1992 para. 8.7.
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leadership, but is unacceptable in the form of double standards.95
Executing juvenile offenders or declining to enforce International
Court of Justice preliminary stays of execution have weakened the
ability of the United States to help mediate human rights violations
around the world.96  Transnational legal process involves
internalizing international law norms into domestic legal systems.
Koh notes that, "the goal should not be to give these nations an easy
way out of their commitments, but to enmesh them within the
global treaty system to encourage them to internalize those norms
over time."97 Koh explains that transnational interaction between
judicial systems helps integrate human rights principles into
international and domestic law.98
Those who support eventual abolition of the death penalty in the
United States have attempted to internalize recognition through
increased interactions between the United States Government and
the ICJ. Using a Kantian perspective, Jenny Martinez describes
the goal as "a system in which independent rights-respecting,
democratic nation-states interact with one another in a zone of
comity, cooperation, and law."99 She goes on to recommend that the
United States consider the use of a "second-look" doctrine such as
that used by the German Constitutional Court. 100 Countries can
benefit from requiring the federal government to consult and
cooperate with states before signing treaties that affect issues
primarily controlled by states. In turn, states within a federal
system would have to enforce international legal obligations.
III. EXTRADITION OF CAPITAL OFFENDERS IN LIGHT OF THE ECHR
AND ICCPR
Given the lack of international law supporting a complete
prohibition of capital punishment, combined with a strong
international condemnation of torture, individuals advocating the
abolition of the death penalty have turned to the use of torture
provisions to restrict the implementation of the death penalty. The
European Court of Human Rights has grappled with the definition
95 Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1485-87
(2003).
96 Id. at 1486-87.
9' Id. at 1508.
9' Id. at 1506-07.
9 Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 462
(2003).
'0o Id. at 503-04.
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of torture in a series of Article 3 decisions, ranging from a school's
right to impose corporal punishment to a country's right to extradite
a fugitive who is wanted for murder.
A. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Article 3 of the ECHR states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ' 01 A
number of ECHR cases have begun to clarify the protection that
Article 3 provides. The European Court of Human Rights was
unwilling to hold that capital punishment itself constitutes torture
since this would appear to contradict Article 2 acceptance of its use.
Instead, the European Court of Human Rights established that
Article 3 prohibits three broad activities: torture, inhuman
treatment or punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment.
The following series of cases laid the groundwork for the ECHR to
find that placing an individual on death row can constitute torture
ii violation of Article 3.
In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights considered whether British interrogation techniques used
against suspected terrorists constituted a violation of Article 3.102
British authorities in Northern Ireland had interrogated fourteen
individuals who were thought to be Irish Republican Army ("IRA").
terrorists. The European Court of Human Rights created a
standard whereby the ill treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity to constitute torture. 103  Torture necessitated intense
cruelty and significant physical suffering. While the European
Court of Human Rights held that the techniques were "inhuman"
and "degrading," they fell short of "torture."1 4 Looking at a variety
of factors, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that the
interrogation techniques caused severe physical and mental
suffering amounting to "inhuman treatment." 105 Thus, the British
government had violated Article 3. Further, the European Court of
Human Rights found that the techniques were also "degrading"
because they were "such as to arouse in their victims feelings of
.0 ECHR, supra note 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
102 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). The British interrogation techniques included: (a) wall
standing (forcing the detainees to remain for hours in a stress position), (b) hooding (putting a
bag over the detainees' heads), (c) subjection to continuous loud noise, (d) sleep deprivation
and (e) deprivation of water and food. Id.
103 Id. para. 162.
104 Id. para. 167.
105 Id.
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fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing
them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance."'
0 6
Thus, Ireland v. United Kingdom distinguishes among "torture,"
"inhuman treatment or punishment," and "degrading treatment or
punishment" based on all the circumstances of a given case.'
°7
An examination must be made regarding length and physical or
physiological effects of the treatment. Additionally, such factors as
the age, health and gender of the victim can play a role in
determining whether a violation of Article 3 has occurred. In Tyrer
v. United Kingdom, °8 the European Court of Human Rights further
developed its Article 3 standard by examining an Isle of Man
statute allowing for judicial corporal punishment. At age fifteen,
Anthony M. Tyrer was convicted of assault of another student and
was sentenced to three lashes with a birch rod.'0
9 While the
European Court of Human Rights concluded that this punishment
did not reach the minimum severity to be "inhuman" pursuant to
Ireland v. United Kingdom, the conduct did amount to "degrading
punishment.""' 0 The European Court of Human Rights based this
finding on the totality of the circumstances, "in particular, on the
nature and context of the punishment itself and the manner and
method of its execution.""' Judicial corporal punishment involves
one person inflicting physical violence on another person; as
institutionalized violence, it is carried out by state authorities."
2
The European Court of Human Rights found that despite a lack of
severe or long-term physical damage, the punishment violated the
Article 3 guarantee of physical integrity and dignity."
3 While
safeguards were implemented and Tyrer did not suffer severe or
lasting physical damage, the European Court of Human Rights held
that the corporal punishment levied on Tyrer was an infringement
of his dignity and physical integrity, and was therefore
"degrading."",14
In Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, the European Court of
Human Rights addressed the propriety of using a leather strap to
discipline Scottish school children.' '5 The mothers of two students
106 Id.
107 Id. para. 162.
'0' 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
109 Id.
'10 Id. paras. 29, 33, 35.
... Id. para. 30.
112 Id. para. 33.
113 Id.
11 Id. para. 35.
115 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
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each filed separate applications with the European Commission,
contending that corporal punishment violated Article 3.116
Campbell was a student at a school that imposed corporal
punishment."17  The Regional Education Council had refused to
guarantee that Campbell would not be subject to such treatment. 18
Likewise, Cosans was a student at a school with a similar policy.
He was to receive corporal punishment for having allegedly taken a
shortcut through a cemetery on his way home from school." 9 The
European Court of Human Rights did not feel that the
circumstances of the applicants amounted to a violation of Article
3.120 Yet, this case remains important for its expansion of the notion
that potential punishment or treatment may violate Article 3.121
Together, these cases establish an Article 3 standard that
provides guidelines for determining what constitutes torture,
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. In
implementing the standard, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances. 22  Further, the European Court of Human Rights
will examine the prospective physical and psychological effects on
the individual. 123 The Tyrer Court made several findings that lay a
solid foundation for the European Court's subsequent holding in
Soering. For instance, it noted that the violation against Tyrer was
exacerbated by the delay between sentencing and execution. 124 The
European Court of Human Rights rejected the government's
argument that corporal punishment was an effective deterrent,
concluding that provisions of Article 3 are absolute and therefore
must be strictly construed. 125  Perhaps most significantly, the
European Court of Human Rights rejected the Attorney-General for
the Isle of Man's argument that the judicial corporal punishment
was not a violation of Article 3 because it did not violate local
conventions. 126
Similarly, in Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, the
116 Id. para. 20.
"' Id. para. 9.
118 Id.
"9 Id. para. 10.
120 Id. para. 42 (1).
121 Id. para. 26.
122 See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 30 (1978); see also Soering
v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 89 (1989).12' Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 33; see Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 111.
124 Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 33.
25 The Court emphasized that "it [is] never permissible to have recourse to punishments
which [are] contrary to Article 3, whatever their deterrent effect might be." Id. para. 31.26 Id. para. 31.
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European Court of Human Rights found that "provided it is
sufficiently real and immediate, a mere threat of conduct prohibited
by Article 3 may itself be in conflict with that provision. Thus, to
threaten an individual with torture might in some circumstances
constitute at least 'inhuman treatment."
' 127
While this case was in the context of corporal punishment, it has
had an impact on subsequent decisions concerning capital
punishment and prison conditions.
12
B. Soering v. The United Kingdom
In the absence of an international consensus on capital
punishment, human rights advocates have sought to obstruct the
use of the death penalty on the grounds that the living conditions on
death row constitutes torture. In Soering, the European Court of
Human Rights found that the United Kingdom would violate Article
3 of the ECHR if it extradited Soering to the United States to face
capital punishment for murder charges. 129 While critics argued that
the Soering decision impeded extradition law and would turn
Europe into a "safe haven for fugitive[s]," death penalty
abolitionists promoted the decision as proof that capital punishment
no longer constituted a justifiable punishment under international
human rights law. 3°
Jens Soering, a teenage West German national, accompanied his
diplomat parents to live in the United States.'3 ' He then went to
the University of Virginia and fell in love with classmate Elizabeth
Haysom. Haysom's parents intensely disliked Soering; animosity
that eventually culminated in a plan between Haysom and Soering
to kill her parents. Soering carried out this plan in 1985, fleeing
shortly thereafter with Haysom to the United Kingdom. Upon
hearing that Haysom and Soering had been picked up for check
fraud, the United States requested their extradition. While Haysom
did not challenge the request and was returned to the United
States, 3 2 Soering objected to being extradited.'33
127 Campbell & Cosans, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 26 (1982) (emphasis added).
.2 It also has implications for treatment of prisoners generally, a topic that has recently
been the subject of intense debate regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. See
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
129 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 111 (1989).
130 Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases
After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 86 (1992).
131 Id. at 104 (discussing the background of the Soering case).
131 Id. She pleaded guilty as an accessory to murder and was sentenced to ninety years in
prison. Id.
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Soering argued "the British Government violated Article IV of the
U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty by failing to obtain an absolute
assurance from Virginia prosecutors that they would not seek the
death penalty."'13 4  Virginia prosecutors only agreed to let the
sentencing judge know about the British government's wish that
Soering not be put to death.' Soering argued that such an
arrangement did not meet the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty
requirements.' 36  The divisional court rejected Soering's claim,
finding instead that the Foreign Secretary had discretion to
determine the sufficiency of assurances. 37  In contrast, the
European Court of Human Rights did not leave a wide margin of
appreciation for executive deference.' 38
Once he had exhausted his remedies in the United Kingdom,
Soering applied to the European Commission. 139 In a six-to-five
vote, the Commission rejected Soering's Article 3 claim, finding that
"the death row phenomenon did not constitute inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."'' 40  The Commission also
rejected Soering's Article 6 claim, noting that the United Kingdom
should not be held responsible for the fact that there was a "lack of
funds for legal aid in Virginia."' 4' The Commission did however find
an Article 13 violation because United Kingdom extradition
procedures "unduly restricted" limited judicial review of a fugitive's
claim. 142
The European Court of Human Rights found that the United
Kingdom had an obligation under Article 3 not to extradite Soering
to the United States where he faced "a real risk of being subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment."'' 43 The European
Court of Human Rights based its Soering finding on the death row
phenomenon as opposed to capital punishment since the ECHR did
not prohibit the death penalty.' 44 Regardless of the rationale, the
Soering decision left the British government with a dilemma. If it
extradited Soering, it would be in violation of the ECHR. If it did
133 Id.
114 See id. at 105 & n. 107. See also Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 22.
135 Shea, supra note 130, at 97.
136 Id.
137 id.
131 Id. at 98.
9 Id. at 105.
140 Id.
141 Id.
141 Id. at 106.
141 Id. at 108.
See id. at 109-11.
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not extradite Soering, it would violate the U.S.-U.K. Extradition
Treaty, which requires extradition for capital offenses when the
requesting State provides assurances that are acceptable to the
requested nation. Today, Soering would not be put to death for a
similar offense in the United Kingdom. 145  The United Kingdom
surrendered Soering when Virginia prosecutors finally agreed to
give assurances that he would not be tried for a capital 
offense.1 46
Extradition law combines international and national law.
Traditionally, these treaties have been seen as agreements between
States.147 Not granting fugitive standing to challenge violations is
in keeping with the traditional perspective that States are the only
subjects of international law.1 48 In such a paradigm, individuals are
merely objects of international law. As a result, an individual who
is to be extradited has little recourse to ensure that his or her
human rights are considered.
Courts did not play an official role in considering extradition
cases until the mid-1800s1 49  Extradition remained exclusively
within the realm of foreign policy, to be decided by heads of state.
150
Michael Shea notes that:
Monarchs regarded the fugitive as part of the currency of
diplomacy, in the same way as their modern counterparts
now look upon foreign aid, military supplies or a barrel of oil.
The surrender of a fugitive often raised sensitive political
concerns that required the attention of political officials in
the government. The head of state enjoyed absolute
discretion in carrying out extradition agreements and could
surrender fugitives or refuse their surrender without
,41 See Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, Note, The United States-"Capital" of The World: An
Analysis of Why the United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International
Trend is Towards its Abolition, 24 BROOK. J. INTL L. 855, 857 (1999). British law has
steadily progressed towards total abolition of capital punishment. Parliament made efforts to
abolish capital offenses as early as the 1940s. By 1956, England became a de facto
abolitionist state, and in 1983 the death penalty was prohibited for all civilian offenses. No
one has been executed in the United Kingdom since 1964. The Criminal Justice Bill in 1998
removed treason and piracy from the list of capital crimes. Capital punishment could be
implemented under military law until the renewal of the Armed Forces Act in 2001, after
which the United Kingdom became an abolitionist country for all offenses. Amnesty
International Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last visited June 16, 2005).
46 Shea, supra note 130, at 112. Soering was convicted of first-degree murder. On June
21, 1990, a Virginia jury sentenced him to two life terms. Id. at 112 n.149. See also British
High Court Refuses to Block Soering Extradition, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 22, 1989.
147 See Shea, supra note 130, at 87.
148 Id.
149 Id.
ISO Id.
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answering to any domestic authority.'5
The Rule of Non-Inquiry further weakens a fugitive's opportunity
to voice an objection since it prevents him or her from offering
evidence of likely abuse if he or she is to be extradited.'52 The rule
"has blocked judicial inquiry into the fairness of judicial procedures
and penal conditions in the requesting country."'53 This provision
prohibits judges from examining judicial and penal circumstances in
the requesting country. 5 4  Instead, the judiciary is to defer to
executive decisions.
Soering illustrates how difficult it can be to find the balance
between crime prevention and the protection of human rights.155
Countering the rule of non-inquiry and its preference for a limitedjudicial role in extradition cases, Soering provides a framework for
enveloping human rights protections into extradition law. Soering's
broad notion of State responsibility offers a powerful rationale for
strengthening judicial review of human rights in extradition cases.
Judicial deference to "foreign policy" should not justify human
rights violations by other States. The growing recognition of human
rights in the international community supports the increased
judicial scrutiny of human rights in extradition requests. Human
rights are not simply aspects to be weighed in foreign policy
decisions. No matter how criminal their conduct has been, whether
a fugitive may be subjected to torture in another country requires
judicial inquiry.
Courts have access to information about the legal systems of
other states and are therefore capable of analyzing human rights
aspects of extradition cases. 5 6 Such information is often "freely
available," particularly with regard to actual laws of a requesting
State.157  Moreover, a number of government and private
organizations specialize in distributing human rights materials. 58
For these reasons, extradition cases should not be treated as non-justiciable. 5 9 In providing a model for judicial review, Soering has
had three important impacts on extradition law. 160 It has affected
l~' Id. at 87-88.
152 Id. at 93.
153 Id.
154 Id.
"' See id.
156 Id. at 135.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 104.
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requested State responsibility, established a standard of proof for
potential violations, and clarified that anticipated punishments can
be inhuman and degrading.
161
First, the Soering Court held that a requested State is responsible
for the way in which a prisoner is treated after extradition if that
treatment is in violation of the ECHR. 62 The European Court of
Human Rights found that by extraditing Soering, the United
Kingdom would incur liability for having 'subjected' him to any
treatment he received in the United States that violated Article
3."163 Thus, a member State has the obligation not only to protect
everyone within their jurisdiction under Article 1, but also to
"secure" rights and obligations of the ECHR to individuals sent to
States who are not members of the ECHR.' 6 If it is clear that the
treatment would violate human rights provisions in the requested
State, then the State should have the same obligation not to
extradite as it would have to make sure that an individual's rights
are protected within the requested State.
65
Second, a "substantial grounds" standard of proof will be used for
potential violations. 66 While Campbell clarified that "threat[s]" can
constitute a violation of Article 3, the European Court of Human
Rights did not specify a standard of proof for assessing a potential
violation other than stating that it must be "sufficiently real and
immediate.' 67 Soering went further in finding that an "extradition
violated Article 3 'where substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that the [fugitive], if extradited, faces a real risk of being
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment in the
requesting country.""
68
The European Court of Human Rights held that Soering was in
such a position since the Virginia prosecutors planned to pursue
capital punishment. 69 The "assurances" offered were insufficient to
reduce the risk of an Article 3 violation. 70 Soering created a new
standard of proof for potential violations in the extradition
context.'7' Now a requested State must show that a breach of the
161 Id.
162 Id. at 106.
163 Id.
'6 Id. at 107.
165 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 111 (1989).
166 Shea, supra note 130, at 108.
167 Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) para. 26 (1982).
168 Shea, supra note 130, at 108.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
20051
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ECHR is "highly unlikely."'' 2
Finally, anticipated punishment falls within the Article 3
category of 'inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 73
The European Court of Human Rights' third holding established
"that the 'death row phenomenon constituted inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment' under Article 3.,,174 Noting that Article 2
of the ECHR allows for capital punishment, the European Court of
Human Rights refused to go as far as to say that Article 3 outright
prohibits it. 75  Rather, the European Court of Human Rights
concluded that the way in which Virginia implements capital
punishment amounted to inhuman or degrading punishment. 176
C. Responses to the Soering Decision
Several Canadian extradition cases resemble the dilemma that
the United Kingdom faced in Soering. In particular, Kindler v.
Canada,7 7 Ng v. Canada,7 8 and United States v. Burns7 9 provide a
useful framework with which to assess the impact that Soering has
had on the extradition of capital offenders.
1. The Canadian Approach to Extradition Law Subsequent to
Soering
Joseph Kindler was convicted of murder in Pennsylvania in
1983. 0 The jury had called for capital punishment, but Kindler
escaped to Canada before he was formally sentenced.'' Similarly,
Charles Ng escaped to Canada in 1985.182 Ng left before California
was able to charge him with twelve counts of murder.1 3 If convicted
in California, Ng likely would have faced capital punishment.8 4
Pennsylvania and California based their extradition requests on the
U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty.8 5  Canada, like the United
172 id.
"' Id. at 109.
174 id.
175 id.
176 id.
171 [1991] S.C.R. 779.
171 [1991] S.C.R. 858.
"' [2001] S.C.R. 283.
"0 Shea, supra note 130, at 114; Kindler, S.C.R. at 840.
... Shea, supra note 130, at 114-15; Kindler, S.C.R. at 840.182 Shea, supra note 130, at 115; Ng, S.C.R. at 859.
183 Id.
184 Sd.185 hea, supra note 130, at 115; Kindler, S.C.R. at 840)-41. The U.S.-Canada Extradition
[Vol. 68
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Kingdom in Soering, did not require that the United States make
such assurances.'86 Kindler and Ng challenged Canada's decision.,
8
The Canadian Supreme Court consolidated the Kindler and Ng
cases, hearing them both on the same day.18 In a pair of four-to-
three rulings, the Canadian Supreme Court held that Canada would
not violate the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms (Canadian Charter) by extraditing Kindler and Ng to the
United States. 189  The plurality opinion, written by Justice
McLachlin, assessed whether extradition without assurances would
shock the Canadian conscience.' 90 Kindler and Ng argued that it
would. 191 In 1976, the Canadian Parliament had virtually abolished
capital punishment except for a few military offenses.' 92 Canadians
had rejected an initiative to reinstate capital punishment for
civilian crimes in 1987.193 Justice McLachlin did not find that such
public opinion indicators reflected an unambiguous sentiment that
the death penalty shocked the Canadian conscience.' 94  In
particular, Justice McLachlin pointed out that the vote for
reinstatement had been narrow, and thus there was not a strong
consensus against capital punishment. 195 He went on to note that
any shock to the Canadians would be outweighed by recognition
that the United States has similar democratic procedural
safeguards to those of Canada.' 96 Thus, while Canada abolished
capital punishment for nearly all crimes in 1976, the Supreme
Court of Canada found that extraditing Kindler to a country where
he might be executed would not shock the Canadian conscience. 9'
In contrast, the dissent asserted that capital punishment is
always "cruel and unusual."' 98 Justice Sopinka's dissent addressed
the issue of public opinion, noting that abolition of the death
Treaty is comparable to the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty relied upon in Soering. Article 6 of
the U.S.-Canadian Treaty is similar to Article IV of the U.S.-U.K. Treaty. Both allow the
requested State to refuse extradition unless it receives assurances that capital punishment
will not be sought. Shea, supra note 130, at 115.
186 Shea, supra note 130, at 115; Kindler, S.C.R. at 841.
187 Id.
188 Shea, supra note 130, at 114; Ng, S.C.R. at 861.
189 See Kindler, S.C.R. at 841-42.
190 Id. at 849, 852.
19' Id. at 850-51.
192 Id. at 851.
193 Id. at 852.
19' Id. at 852. For an example of how the United States Supreme Court has viewed such
public opinion factors, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173-81 (1976).
'9' Kindler, S.C.R. at 852 (McLachlin, J., plurality opinion).
196 Kindler, S.C.R. at 852.
197 Id. at 851-52.
198 Id. at 790 (Sopinka, J., dissenting).
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penalty in 1976 and refusal to reinstate it in 1987 provided a strong
indication that Canadians are "clearly opposed to the death
penalty."199  Thus, not securing assurances from the requesting
state would indeed shock the Canadian conscience. 00 The Canadian
Court in Kindler and Ng appears to limit the Soering decision to
situations in which youth, mental disability, or other factors might
lead to a violation similar to that of Soering's. Yet, the fact that the
Canadian Court cited Soering at all is significant since Canada is
not bound by the ECHR.
2. The Human Rights Committee Response to Soering
In contrast with the Soering decision, the Canadian Court found
that Canada was not responsible for protecting Canadian Charter
rights beyond its own borders.20 1  The United Nations Human
Rights Committee disagreed.02 When Ng brought a claim that
Canada would be violating the ICCPR, the Human Rights
Committee followed the Soering rationale on State responsibility.2 3
In Ng v. Canada, the Human Rights Committee found that
Canada's extradition of Ng to the United States violated Article 7 of
the ICCPR that prohibited cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.04 Just as the European Court of Human Rights
held that the United Kingdom could have reasonably foreseen the
abuse of Soering's human rights in the United States, the Human
Rights Committee found that Canada could have reasonably
foreseen a violation of Ng's rights.2 5 In determining a violation of
Article 7 in the Ng case, the Human Rights Committee followed the
Soering real risk standard.2 6 Thus, the Human Rights Committee
found that the prolonged suffering of dying by gas asphyxiation
reached the level of cruel and inhuman treatment pursuant to the
ICCPR.2 °7
Only a few months earlier, the Human Rights Committee came to
'M Kindler, S.C.R. at 789-93 (Sopinka, J., dissenting). Justice Sopinka also countered the
plurality's safe haven contention, noting that it was artificial only to lay out the options of (1)
extraditing without assurances and (2) not extraditing at all since a third option of (3)
extraditing with assurances was also available. Id. at 792 (Sopinka, J., dissenting).
200 See id. at 792-93 (Sopinka, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 854.
202 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 40, at 199.
203 See id.
204 Id.
205 Id. The Committee noted that California death sentences are carried out via gas
asphyxiation. Id.
206 id.
207 Id.
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the opposite conclusion when it heard Kindler's case.08 Perhaps
this was because the Committee felt that a convicted murderer
should be treated differently than someone who had not yet been
charged. Unlike Soering or Ng, Kindler had already been
sentenced, and thus would clearly be going directly to death row.
Alternatively, gas asphyxiation may have appeared more
intolerable than lethal injection since it often takes longer to kill a
person. Kindler argued that since Canada abolished the death
penalty, it should not be able to send an individual to a country
where he or she could receive a punishment that is not permitted in
Canada. The Human Rights Committee's decisions in Kindler and
Ng indicate that the death penalty can be a violation of the Article 7
cruel and unusual treatment of the ICCPR, but that such a
conclusion depends on the facts of the given case.
3. Several Unresolved Extradition Considerations
The Canadian Supreme Court and the Human Rights Committee
in Kindler rejected one of the most significant aspects of the Soering
holding, namely that the "death row phenomenon" constituted
torture. The Canadian Supreme Court, in Kindler, stated that: "It
would be ironic if delay caused by the appellant's taking advantage
of the full and generous avenue of the appeals available to him
should be viewed as a violation of fundamental justice., 20 9 The
Human Rights Committee, in its Kindler analysis, held that
"prolonged periods of detention under a severe custodial regime on
death row cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely
availing himself of appellate remedies. '210  In contrast, the Privy
Council came to the opposite conclusion in Pratt v. Attorney General
for Jamaica.21  The Privy Council found that when an individual
utilizes his or her legitimate right to appeal, the delay which results
can not be blamed on the death row inmate since:
It is part of the human condition that a condemned man will
take every opportunity to save his life through use of the
appellate procedure. If the appellate procedure enables the
prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a period of
20 Kindler v. Canada, 98 I.L.R. 426 (1993).
209 Kindler, S.C.R. at 838 (LaForest, J., plurality opinion).
210 Kindler, 98 I.L.R. at 447.
21 98 I.L.R. 335, 348, 354 (P.C. 1993) (finding that a delay of twelve years on death row
before execution constituted, "inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment" was in
breach of Section 17 of the Jamaican Constitution).
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years, the fault is to be attributed to the appellate system
that permits such delay and not to the prisoner who takes
advantage of it.
2t2
These varying interpretations illustrate that a great deal of
controversy still surrounds whether the "death row phenomenon"
constitutes torture, and the degree to which judicial systems
consider the decisions of their counterparts around the world.
Clearly, the Soering case has had a significant impact on
extradition law. Even member States to the ECHR, however, are
not following Soering without conducting their own analysis of the
issues. For instance, in Netherlands v. Short,213 an American soldier
was accused of murdering his wife. The United States requested
that Short be extradited pursuant to the 1951 NATO Status of
Forces Agreement between the Netherlands and the United
States.21 4 Upon learning that the United States would not give any
assurance that capital punishment would not be sought, the Dutch
trial court concluded that it would be impossible to adhere to both
the extradition treaty and the Sixth Protocol of the ECHR.21 5
Unlike Soering, the High Court (Hoge Raad) did not go as far as to
find that the ECHR took precedence. It concluded that a balance
must be struck between the parties. In weighing the competing
interests, the High Court held that Short's human rights were more
important than The Netherlands' interest in extradition.2t 6
However, just as in Soering, Short was eventually handed over once
the United States made assurances that the death penalty would
not be implemented.
21 7
212 Id. at 353.
23 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990).
214 Id. at 1376.
215 Id. at 1378.
216 Id. at 1389.
27 Id.; see Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 40, at 194-96. Conditional
extraditions that surrender an individual as long as he or she will not be charged with a
capital offense can be instrumental in reaching a compromise. Id. at 206. Such agreements
can also avoid the safe-haven problem. Protecting human rights does not have to come at the
expense of allowing fugitives to escape justice. A requested state that consistently extradites
once it is provided with assurances that capital punishment will not be sought is unlikely to
attract fugitives. However, an Italian court, in Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia,
Corte cost., 27 June 1996, n.223, 79 RMSTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 815 (1996),
noted that assurances by the requesting state that capital punishment will not be used are
not sufficient since such statements by the executive branch are not binding on the judicial
branch. See Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 40, at 206 n.143.
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4. Canadian Reconsideration of Extradition: United States v. Burns
In United States v. Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court held that
"in the absence of exceptional circumstances, which we refrain from
trying to anticipate, assurances in death penalty cases are always
constitutionally required."2" 8  It remains to be seen whether
extradition of al-Qaeda members will be seen as "exceptional
circumstances." The Canadian Supreme Court is moving very close
to a per se rule requiring that assurances be sought before
extradition in potential capital cases. This is a striking reversal of
direction in the ten years since Kindler and Ng. Burns held that the
Minister of Justice that ordered the extradition of Canadians Glenn
Sebastian Burns and Atif Ahmad Rafay had violated the Canadian
Charter of Rights.2'9 Both individuals faced capital murder charges
in the United States and should not have been extradited without
assurances that the death penalty would not be pursued.22 °
IV. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Legislatures are elected by majorities that are not always
interested in protecting minorities. For this reason, it is important
for courts to enforce a constitutional bill of rights or an
international human rights treaty even if the occasional ruling is
unpopular. Liberal democracy is not simply about majoritarian
decision-making and popular rule; it involves a liberal notion of
protection. The international community has criticized the United
States for violating both procedural and substantive provisions of
international law. Recognizing that public opinion within the
United States has played a large role in death penalty politics, the
human rights movement seeks to raise awareness about the
attitude that the United States has taken towards international
conventions and the inadequacy of the United States' standards in
implementing the death penalty.
A. National Consensus: The Scope of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
The United States is "the only western democratic state to employ
the death penalty for ordinary crimes during times of peace. 22' In
218 [2001] S.C.R. 283, 323.
219 Id. at 360.
220 Id.
221 Prinzo, supra note 145, at 856. The United States has had the death penalty since its
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the 1850s, several American states were at the forefront of the
death penalty abolitionist movement. In this period, Michigan,
Wisconsin and Rhode Island all abolished the death penalty for
murder. 2  Internationally, Portugal was the first European country
to abolish the death penalty in 1864; Italy and The Netherlands
soon followed.223  Executions in Europe became rare by the end of
the nineteenth century.224 In the United States, the trend has
developed in the opposite direction. This is illustrated by the fact
that Kansas 225 and New York 226 have reinstated the death penalty,
bringing the number of retentionist states to thirty-eight.2 27  The
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 broadened
federal law significantly.228  It makes the death penalty
discretionary for over fifty offenses, including crimes that have not
resulted in death.229  In 1988, twenty-five of the thirty-six states
that had capital punishment had not put anyone to death in well
over a decade. 230  By 1995, this number had fallen to twelve
states. 23  The United States executed sixty-five prisoners in 2003;
by March 3, 2004, the United States had executed over 900
prisoners since the death penalty was reinstated in 1977.232
Capital punishment in the United States came to an abrupt end
colonial period. At that time, there were thirteen capital crimes: "idolatry, witchcraft,
blasphemy, murder, assault in sudden anger, sodomy, buggery, adultery, statutory rape,
rape, manstealing, perjury in a capital trial, and rebellion." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
335 (1972).
222 Hood, supra note 6, at 518.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (1995).
226 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWv § 400.27(1), (11)(a)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
227 The New York State Court of Appeals held the State Death Penalty law
unconstitutional on June 24, 2004. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). A
moratorium went into effect. Law Enforcement Officials Call on New York State Legislature to
Keep New York's Unjust Death Penalty Law Off the Books, available at
http://nyadp.org/main/police811 (last visited June 16, 2005). Law Enforcement officials are
asking the New York State Legislature not to lift the ban. Id. Catherine Abate, former
Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction and Probation and Chair of the
New York State Crime Victims Board, notes that life imprisonment without parole "provides
a margin for error in cases of wrongful convictions. Since 1973, 115 innocent people have
been sentenced to death in the U.S. That's an alarming figure that ought to give anyone
pause." Id.
228 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598
(1995).
229 Id. § 3591(a)(1)-(2)(d)
230 Hood, supra note 6, at 519.
231 Id.
232 Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited, March 7, 2005) [hereinafter
Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty].
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in 1972 when the Supreme Court found, in Furman v. Georgia, that
the manner in which Georgia's death penalty was implemented was
unconstitutionally arbitrary and thus violated both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 233 As Justice Douglas pointed out:
We deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination
whether defendants committing these crimes should die or
be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the
selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the
whim of one man or of 12.234
Furman had the effect of invalidating death penalty statutes in
thirty-nine states, the federal government and the District of
Columbia. Yet, only a year after Furman was decided, twenty
states had passed new death penalty statutes with lists of
aggravating and mitigating factors to guide judges and juries.
235
Given the new legislative landscape, by 1976 the Supreme Court
found that capital punishment could be conducted in a way that did
not conflict with the Constitution. 236 In Gregg v. Georgia, a
plurality of the Supreme Court found that "the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution. 237  Since Gregg,
Congress has passed a number of statutes that have expanded the
use of the death penalty.238  In 1984, twenty-one people were
executed. In 1993, thirty-eight people were executed. In 1995, fifty-
six people were executed. In 1997, seventy-four people were
executed. As Kristi Tumminello Prinzo has noted: "By 1990,
approximately two executions occurred each month. 2 139 The number
of capital convictions has also risen substantially with the mid
1980s figure of approximately one thousand people on death row
growing to over three thousand individuals by the mid 1990s. 240 By
the end of 2004, over 3,400 prisoners were under sentence of death
233 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972).
234 Id. at 253. (Douglas, J., concurring).
233 Nathan A. Forrester, Judge Versus Jury: The Continuing Validity of Alabama's Capital
Sentencing Regime after Ring v. Arizona, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1157, 1196 n.334 (2003).
236 Florencio J. Yuzon, Conditions and Circumstances of Living on Death Row-Violative of
Individual Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?: Divergent Trends of Judicial Review in
Evaluating the "Death Row Phenomenon," 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 39, 59 (1996)
[hereinafter Yuzon].
... 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
23 See Yuzon, supra note 236, at 59-60. "[I]ncluding: (1) espionage by a member of the
armed forces, (2) witness tampering resulting in death, and (3) the intentional killing of a law
enforcement official" in specific situations. Id.
239 Prinzo, supra note 145, at 873.
240 See id. at 873-74.
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in the United States. 241
In applying the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment, the
Supreme Court established a two-prong "excessiveness" standard.2
First, the punishment cannot inflict unnecessary and wanton pain,
and second, the punishment must be proportionate to the crime.243
While the actual language of Article 3 of the ECHR and the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are similar, the United States
has used a much narrower form of judicial review. With regard to
the first prong, the Gregg Court stated that "an assessment of
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged
sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment .... It requires... that [a court] look to objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction."2 "
In determining whether the United States' public considered
capital punishment to be cruel and unusual, the Court looked at
jury sentencing patterns and the fact that death penalty statutes
remained in thirty-five states after Furman.245 The U.S. Supreme
Court found such factors conclusive in determining the death
penalty had popular support and, thus, did not constitute a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment.246
Advocates who seek to abolish the death penalty point to
empirical studies that show that capital punishment fails to have a
deterrent effect on violent crime in society.247 One argument for
why the death penalty should not be imposed for crimes other than
murder is that criminals who are likely to receive capital
punishment are more inclined to murder in order to prevent
someone from becoming a witness.24' Death penalty proponents, on
the other hand, use crime statistics to indicate that the death
penalty has a deterrent effect. 240 They also note that prisons are
over-crowded and that felons are released on parole having served
only a small portion of their sentences.
Elected judges are sensitive to public opinion concerning capital
241 Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, supra note 232.
242 Yuzon, supra note 236, at 62.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 61-62; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
245 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80.
246 Id. at 178, 180-81.
247 Ariane M. Schreiber, States That Kill: Discretion and the Death Penalty-A Worldwide
Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263, 265 n.3 (1996).
24' Id. at 265 n.3.
249 Id. at 264.
250 Id.
[Vol. 68
HeinOnline -- 68 Alb. L. Rev. 942 2004-2005
2005] International Death Penalty Jurisprudence
punishment. 25 1 As Supreme Court Justice Stevens has pointed out:
"The higher authority to whom present day capital judges may be
'too responsive' is political climate, in which judges who covet higher
office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must constantly
profess their fealty to the death penalty. 252
The 1994, the New York gubernatorial campaign between Mario
Cuomo and George Pataki provided one of the best examples of how
the death penalty debate has become a central election issue.
3
Cuomo consistently opposed reintroduction of the death penalty
throughout his time as governor.254 Yet, opinion polls indicated that
a majority of the residents of New York were in favor of capital
punishment.255 Reinstating capital punishment was one of Pataki's
primary campaign issues. 6  Given a population uninformed about
the way in which capital punishment has been implemented in the
United States, this "tough on crime" stance helped Pataki win the
257
election.
B. United States Practice in Relation to International
Standards
In 1984, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed a resolution
adopted by the Economic and Social Council. 5 8 This resolution set
25 See Prinzo, supra note 145, at 885.
252 Id.
25 Schreiber, supra note 247, at 264 n.1.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Safeguards Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty,
E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 33, U.N. Doc. E/1984184 (1984)
[hereinafter Safeguards I].
1. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, capital punishment may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes, it being understood that their scope should not
go beyond intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
2. Capital punishment may be imposed only for a crime for which the death penalty is
prescribed by law at the time of its commission, it being understood that if, subsequent
to the commission of the crime, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
3. Persons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be
sentenced to death, nor shall the death sentence be carried out on pregnant women, or
on new mothers, or on persons who have become insane.
4. Capital punishment may be imposed only when the guilt of the person charged is
based upon clear and convincing evidence leaving no room for an alternative explanation
of the facts.
5. Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by
a competent court after legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair
trial, at least equal to those contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on
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forth safeguards for individuals facing capital punishment."9 The
United Nations subsequently strengthened these safeguards,
adding due process, juvenile and mental disability provisions.26 °
The first set of safeguards states, in effect, that capital punishment
should not be used in an arbitrary manner. 26' There is broad
consensus that the use of the death penalty in the United States
remains arbitrary.2 62 As Roger Hood points out:
Given that the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of
murder meets the threshold required, the reasons why
people are executed have as much to do with factors relating
to their personal biography, their economic status, the status
and race of their victim, and the way the case is processed
through the system, as it has to do with the seriousness of
the offense committed.263
The first safeguard also insists that the death penalty should only
be used for the most serious, exceptional offenses. 264 The expansion
of capital offenses pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 indicates that the United States has a
different conception of "most serious" than the drafters of this
safeguard. The United States is not only unwilling to curb the
current execution rate for murder convictions, but also has allowed
people to be put to death for an expanded range of offenses.
The third safeguard that the United Nations set forth states that
countries should not put juveniles to death.265  The international
Civil and Political Rights, including the right of anyone suspected of or charged with a
crime for which capital punishment may be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all
stages of the proceedings.
6. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to appeal to a court of higherjurisdiction, and steps should be taken to ensure that such appeals shall become
mandatory.
7. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon, or commutation of
sentence; pardon or commutation of sentence may be granted in all cases of capital
punishment.
8. Capital punishment shall not be carried out pending any appeal or other recourse
procedure or other proceeding relating to pardon or commutation of the sentence.
9. Where capital punishment occurs, it shall be carried out so as to inflict the minimum
possible suffering.
239 See id.
26 See Implementation of the United Nations Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the
Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1989/64, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp.
No. 1, at 51, para. 1, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (1989).26 See Safeguards I, supra note 258.
262 See Hood, supra note 6, at 531.
263 Id.
264 See Safeguards I, supra note 258.
265 Id.
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community has agreed upon the age of eighteen as a threshold.
266
Both the Council of Europe and European Union have intervened on
behalf of Simmons' United States Supreme Court case, which
determined that juvenile offenders in United States cannot be put
to death.267
The fourth safeguard prohibits the execution of innocent
individuals.268 As Matas notes, there is no forum for exonerating
innocent people who have been put to death.2 69 "Resurrection of the
dead, executed in error, is beyond human powers. Exculpatory
evidence that is suppressed by the prosecution may later surface
and lead to a new trial. But when the prisoner is dead, the effort to
release the suppressed evidence also dies. 27°
The fifth safeguard tries to confront such occurrences by insisting
on fair procedures. 271  The United States' failure to provide
sufficient legal representation in capital cases, both at the trial and
appellate level, has led to international condemnation of judicial
procedures in capital cases.2 72 Court-appointed lawyers are often
poorly paid and inexperienced.273 Many lawyers have been shown to
be dealing with their first capital case.274 Inadequate funding has
also hindered the United States from conforming to the sixth
safeguard, requiring a right to appeal.275 Individuals on death
row-most of who are indigent-are not entitled to a state-
appointed attorney after their first appeal. 76 The opportunity for
an individual who is convicted of a capital offense to receive
adequate representation is declining.277
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA") in 1996.278 In an effort to respond to terrorism more
effectively, the United States reduced procedural protections.
279
266 Id.
267 David Stout, U.S. Bars Death for Minors Who Kill, INT'L HERALD TRIB., March 2, 2005,
at 1.
261 See Safeguards I, supra note 258.
269 See David Matas, The Death Penalty as a Violation of International Human Rights
Norms, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 254, 255-56 (1994).
270 Id.
271 See Safeguards I, supra note 258.
272 See Hood, supra note 6, at 534-35.
273 Matas, supra note 269, at 256-57.
274 Hood, supra note 6, at 535.
275 Id.
276 See Matas, supra note 269, at 257.
277 Id. at 256-57.
278 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
2179 David Cole, Politicians Need to Halt 'Get Tough' Rhetoric, 146 N.J.L.J. 619 (Nov. 18,
1996).
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Decreasing the number of years that an individual spends on death
row to reduce the death row phenomenon increases the risk of
killing innocent people. Abolishing the death penalty would be a
clear resolution to this dilemma. Apprehension regarding wrongful
executions led to Governor Ryan's 2003 commutation of all 164
death sentences in Illinois.28 ° Ursula Bentele suggests "continued
use of the death penalty violates substantive due process because no
compelling state interest justifies the risk that innocent people will
be put to death.""28  The Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments does not remedy the problem of
executing innocent individuals. Since 1970, over one hundred
people have been sentenced to death that were later discovered to
be innocent.282
V. CONCLUSION
The American legal philosopher, John Rawls, described a state of
nature in which individuals have complete freedom within the
following hypothetical societal framework. People are initially
identical with regard to physical strength, financial security,
religion, race, et cetera. Moreover, these fungible individuals have
no idea what they will become in the future. Given these two basic
tenets, Rawls predicts that the rules that people would establish
would be fair because no one would be able to skew them to benefit
a given individual circumstance. In this way, we can assess laws by
considering whether a given rule would have been agreed upon in
Rawls' state of nature. Without knowing one's future, individuals
would like to be assured that if they are charged with a capital
offense that they would receive a fair trial and that they would not
receive a death sentence based upon such arbitrary considerations
as race or financial resources.
The atrocities of World War II taught Europeans a powerful
lesson. People were thrown into circumstances similar to Rawls'
model. The United States has had less intimate experience with
such social upheaval. As the United States Supreme Court
indicated in Gregg, public awareness is crucial.2 3 If the way in
280 Ryan Keith, Illinois High Court Upholds Ryan's Commutation of Death Sentence, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2004, at 8.28 Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, By Risking Execution of the Innocent, Violate
Substantive Due Process?, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2004).282 Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: Freed From Death Row, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=
1 10 (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).283 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
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which the death penalty is being implemented in the United States
does not shock people it is because they are unaware of the degree
to which the criminal system is broken. In contrast, the American
Bar Association is all too familiar with the current state of affairs
and thus has called for a moratorium on the death penalty.
84
Proactively addressing problems within the judicial system of the
United States is a better approach than having the International
Court of Justice, Human Rights Committee, European Court of
Human Rights, and other judicial bodies find that the use of capital
punishment in the United States is illegal. Ignorance of the law is
no defense, particularly when such ignorance is lethal. The
Supreme Court's willingness to consider transnational
jurisprudence in wrestling with the complexities of proportional
punishment and justice is encouraging. International peace and
security can be restored through cooperative codification of human
rights provisions that balance the rights of any given individual vis
a vis members of society as a whole.
284 See American Bar Association, Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project,
available at http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/ (last visited June 16, 2005).
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